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USING THE ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY 
DOCTRINE TO HOLD PRINCIPALS VICARIOUSLY 
LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF TOLL MANUFACTURERS 
Stephen A. Evans* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Chemical manufacturers frequently enter into agreements with 
outside firms to process industrial grade materials into commercial 
products. These agreements are called tolling contracts.1 In a typical 
tolling contract, the chemical manufacturer (principal) supplies the 
raw materials and production specifications to the toll manufacturer 
who then supplies the labor and equipment to produce the product.2 
The toll manufacturer is paid a "toll" or fee for its production serv-
ices.3 Under a typical tolling arrangement the principal retains title 
to the raw materials during the processing period.4 Although tolling 
arrangements offer needed flexibility to the chemical industry, often 
lax safety standards by toll manufacturers lead to the release of toxic 
chemicals into the environment.5 
The problem caused by the release of toxic chemicals into the 
environment is exacerbated when the toll manufacturer does not have 
the financial resources to pay for the cost of cleaning up the environ-
ment. Often the toll manufacturer responsible for the release of haz-
ardous materials will file for bankruptcy rather than pay for environ-
* Solicitations Editor, 1993-94, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 William Goldfarb, Kepone: A Case Study, 8 ENVTL. L. 645, 649 (1978). 
2 See id. 
3Id. 
4Id. 
5 See, e.g., Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 691 (9th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1375 (8th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 701 F. Supp. 140, 141 (W.D. Tenn. 1987). 
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mental clean-up costs.6 In these situations, the principal that selected 
and hired the toll manufacturer is the only other party with any 
connection to the work that generated the toxic waste. Thus, in in-
stances where the toll manufacturer is insolvent, a legal theory is 
needed to recover damages from the principal. 
Federal and state authorities have made initial efforts to hold prin-
cipals liable for the environmental damage caused by the toll manu-
facturers that they hire. In cases where a toll manufacturer does not 
have the resources to pay damages, the government has used the 
broad language of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)7 to successfully hold 
principals liable for the clean-up costs associated with the environ-
mental contamination caused by toll manufacturers.s CERCLA and 
other public law remedies, however, are only a partial solution to the 
environmental problem that can be caused by toll manufacturers.9 
Although CERCLA is an effective vehicle for holding principal's 
liable for clean-up costs,10 private parties who are harmed by the 
practices of toll manufacturers may find it beneficial to seek redress 
under the common law. Because CERCLA is designed to recover 
clean-up costs, the injury suffered by a private party may not be 
compensable under CERCLA.n In other cases a private party may 
not have the financial resources to undertake a private party response 
cost action under CERCLA.12 For these reasons a common law theory 
of recovery is needed so that harm to private individuals may be 
compensatedP 
Despite the environmental contamination that often results from 
lax safety standards, there are surprisingly few reported common law 
tort cases in which private party plaintiffs have sought to hold prin-
cipals vicariously liable for damages caused by their toll manufactur-
ers. This may be due to the legal relationship that exists between 
principal and toll manufacturer. For example, if a toll manufacturer 
falls under the legal definition of an independent contractor, a princi-
pal will not ordinarily be liable for the actions of that toll manufacturer 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 699 F. Supp 1384, 1385 (S.D. Iowa 1988), 
aff'd, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). 
742 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9642 (1988). 
8 See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1382; Velsicol, 701 F. Supp. at 143. 
9 See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text. 
10 See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989). 
11 See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. 
13 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 257 (1992). 
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under the common law.14 If a toll manufacturer is deemed to be an 
independent contractor, a private party must argue that a tolling 
arrangement falls within one of the exceptions to the independent 
contractor rule.15 
This Comment argues that the common law doctrine of vicarious 
liability for abnormally dangerous activitiesI6 should make a principal 
liable when it hires a toll manufacturer to do work that involves the 
handling or generation of hazardous material. Section II discusses 
tolling arrangements generally, and reviews the cases that have ap-
plied CERCLA to the tolling context. Section III discusses the his-
torical development of vicarious liability and the application of the 
abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to work with hazardous ma-
terials. Section IV argues that existing legal precedent and policy 
considerations support holding a principal liable for the acts of a toll 
manufacturer under the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine. 
II. TOLLING CONTRACTS 
A. Background 
A "toll" is defined as compensation for services renderedY Tolling 
arrangements usually involve two manufacturers, a principal that 
supplies the raw materials and a toll manufacturer that processes 
those materials into a finished product. IS Generally, the principal re-
tains ownership of the raw materials, work in process, and the finished 
product while the toll manufacturer processes them.19 
Tolling arrangements are common to many process industries, in-
cluding chemical manufacturing, because of the economic advantages 
they offer.20 Contracting with a toll manufacturer to process raw 
materials allows a chemical company to avoid equipment modification 
or installation costs that are often necessary to produce a finished 
product.21 By avoiding the time required to retool, chemical producers 
14 See infra notes 94-144 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 143--44 and accompanying text. 
16 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS § 71, at 512-12 
(5th ed. 1984). 
17 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2405 (1986). 
18 See Goldfarb, supra note 1, at 649. 
19 See id. 
20 See Jack G. Lowenstein, Pilot-Plant Tests? Try Toll Manufacturing, CHEMICAL ENGI-
NEERING, May 12, 1986, at 124; A Big Boost for Custom Manufacturers, CHEMICAL WK., Aug. 
8, 1984, at 10. 
21 Lowenstein, supra note 20, at 124. 
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can start production earlier, save time, and lower operating costS.22 
Additionally, a principal that hires a toll manufacture to process raw 
materials frees up its own production capacity for other products, and 
is not left with useless machinery after production is complete.23 
There are also disadvantages to hiring a toll manufacturer. Hiring 
an outside firm may require the sharing of proprietary technology and 
formulas necessary to make the product.24 Additionally, a toll manu-
facturer may decide to cut corners to increase profit margins at the 
expense of safety and the environment.25 Industry analysts warn that 
before entering into a tolling arrangement, a principal should take 
precautions to make certain that the toll manufacturer has adequate 
equipment, staff, skills and financial stability.26 
The disastrous results that can occur when safety precautions are 
not taken is illustrated by Allied Chemical's experience with a toll 
manufacturer that it hired to produce Kepone in the 1970s.27 Allied's 
experience with Kepone illustrates both the reasons that motivate a 
company to hire a toll manufacturer and the harmful consequences 
that can occur when the toll manufacturer does not follow proper 
procedures for handling hazardous materials.28 
Kepone is a pesticide that was used primarily to protect potatoes 
in Europe and bananas in South America.29 Toxicity tests conducted 
by Allied pursuant to federal pesticide law revealed that Kepone, 
which is a chemical relative of DDT, was highly toxic to all species 
tested.30 In 1973, Allied was faced with a dilemma concerning its 
continued production of KeponeP Production demands in other areas 





26Id. Industry groups have made initial efforts to increase the level of supervision that 
principals exercise over the toll manufacturers with whom they do business. In 1991, the 
Chemical Manufacturer's Association approved new Responsible Care Codes of Management 
Practice. Karen Heller, Added CMA Codes Call for Added Care, CHEMICAL WK., Oct. 9, 1991, 
at 25. One of the new codes asks company executives to create an environmental review process 
to screen toll manufacturers. Id. See also David Rotman, The Six Codes of Management 
Practice; an Update on Implementation; Cutting Waste Goes Public, CHEMICAL WK., June 17, 
1992, at 52; David Rotman, Pushing Pollution Prevention, CHEMICAL WK., July 17, 1991, at 30. 
27 See Goldfarb, supra note 1, at 645-53. 
28 See id. 
29 Goldfarb, supra note 1, at 645. Annual sales of Kepone totaled less than $200,000 over a 
sixteen year period and output never exceeded 0.1 percent of America's total pesticide produc-
tion.Id. 
30Id. at 646. 
31Id. at 647-49. 
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ing Allied's manufacturing capacity.32 At the same time, the federal 
government began enforcing regulations that restricted Allied's abil-
ity to dispose of Kepone process wastes.33 These dual pressures led to 
Allied's decision to toll production of Kepone.34 
Using a competitive biding procedure, Allied selected Life Science 
Products Company (LSP) to be its toll manufacturer.35 The AlliediLSP 
tolling contract provided that Allied would supply LSP with all the 
raw materials necessary to produce Kepone.36 Allied retained owner-
ship of the raw materials and determined production rates.37 In re-
turn, LSP produced Kepone for Allied at a cheap cost.38 
In July of 1975 the first sign of trouble appeared when state officials 
investigated working conditions at LSP after an employee complained 
of "the shakes" and weight 10ss.39 The results of that investigation 
revealed a total lack of safety measures at LSP.40 Kepone dust lay 
several inches thick on the floor4 1 and seven out of ten production 
workers were immediately hospitalized.42 Additional investigation 
revealed seventy-five cases of severe Kepone poisoning among the 
workers at LSP and extensive contamination of the air, soil, and water 
near the LSP plant.43 As a result of Kepone contamination, the State 
of Virginia closed down 100 miles of the James River and its tributar-
ies.44 In 1976, a federal grand jury indicted Allied for violations relat-
ing to the production of Kepone.45 Through plea bargaining, Allied 
disposed of most of the counts involving its direct violations of law 
but chose to contest the counts involving its vicarious liability for the 
acts of LSP.46 
32Id. at 649. 
33 Id. at 647-48. 
34 Id. at 647-49. This was not the first time that Allied had tolled production of Kepone. In 
the 1960s, Hooker Chemical and Nease Chemical Co. also entered into tolling agreements with 
Allied. See Marvin H. Zim, Allied Chemical's $20-Million Ordeal with Kepone, FORTUNE, Sept. 
11, 1978, at 82. 
35 Goldfarb, supra note 1, at 649. 
36 Id. at 649-50. 
37Id. at 650. 
38 See id. at 649. 
39 I d. at 652. 
4°Id. 
41 Zim, supra note 34, at 82. 
42 Goldfarb, supra note 1, at 652. 
4., Id. at 653. 
44 Id. 
45Id. 
46 See id. at 657. 
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Without a formal opinion, the Judge found that the prosecution had 
not proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and dismissed all 
counts involving vicarious liability against Allied.47 That decision al-
lowed Allied to profit from the production of Kepone and to avoid the 
environmental costs associated with that production.48 
B. CERCLA and Tolling Contracts 
In the years following the Kepone disaster, federal and state 
authorities have successfully used CERCLA to hold principals liable 
for the acts of toll manufacturers.49 The cases that have applied CER-
CLA to the tolling context both illustrate a public law solution to the 
tolling problem and suggest a common law theory of recovery for 
private party plaintiffs.5O Interpreting the broad language of CER-
CLA, courts have held that a principal is a potentially responsible 
party for the clean-up costs associated with the environmental con-
tamination caused by toll manufacturers.51 
The case of United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp. 52 
was one of the first to hold that a principal can be liable for the acts 
of a toll manufacturer under CERCLA.53 The case was the result of 
a suit brought by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
the State of Iowa against eight pesticide manufacturers.54 Each pes-
ticide manufacturer had hired Aidex, a toll manufacturer, to process 
technical grade pesticides into commercial grade pesticides.55 While 
Aidex performed the actual mixing and formulation of the product, 
the pesticide manufacturers retained ownership of the technical grade 
pesticide while the materials were at the Aidex facility. 56 The Aidex 
tolling operation also generated chemical process wastes that were 
allowed to seep into the soil and ground water.57 By hiring Aidex, the 
EPA claimed that six of the manufacturers had "arranged for" the 
disposal of hazardous substances within the statutory language of 
CERCLA.58 
47 [d. at 660. 
48 See id. at 649-660. 
49 See infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text. 
50 See infra notes 52-63 and accompanying text. 
51 See infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text. 
52 699 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D. Iowa 1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). 
53 See id. at 1390. 
54 United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1375 (8th Cir. 1989). 
55 Aceto, 699 F. Supp. at 1385. 
56 [d. at 1389. 
57 [d. at 1385. 
58 [d. at 1387. For a discussion of the implication of the Aceto decision on CERCLA litigation 
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In reaching its decision to hold Aidex liable, the court found that 
the common law abnormally dangerous activity doctrine was persua-
sive authority for the proposition that a principal can be liable for the 
actions of a toll manufacturer.59 The court reasoned that because the 
defendants could be deemed responsible parties under the common 
law, and the common law is an appropriate guide to interpreting 
CERCLA's language, a principal can also be liable under CERCLA.60 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed 
the Aceto decision.6! While the appeals court noted that the abnor-
mally dangerous activity doctrine did support the imposition of liabil-
ity,62 the court also based its holding on the fact that the principal 
retained ownership of the hazardous materials and that the genera-
tion of toxic waste was inherent in the production process.63 
In the decisions that have followed Aceto, the courts have continued 
to hold that principals can be liable under CERCLA for the acts of 
toll manufacturers.64 These decisions, however, have not revisited the 
abnormally dangerous activity doctrine. Instead they have relied on 
the fact that a principal retains ownership of the raw materials and 
that disposal of hazardous materials was inherent in the production 
process as a basis for imposing liability.65 
Although the use of CERCLA to recover clean-up costs from prin-
cipals is a partial solution to the tolling problem, it does not provide 
private parties with an adequate means of recovery. A private party 
who seeks recovery under CERCLA, faces many substantial hurdles. 
For example, CERCLA does not contain a provision that provides for 
see David J. Benson, Comment, CERCLA Vicarious Liability After United States v. Aceto 
Agricultural Chemicals Corporation: More Than a Common-Law Duty?, 76 IOWA L. REV. 641 
(1991); Duncan J. McCampbell, Casenote, The Triumph of Substance Over Waste Under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 
1980: A Case Analysis of United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 
(8th Cir. 1989), 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 407 (1990); Kim Ruckdaschel-Haley, Note, "Arranging for 
Disposal of Hazardous Substances:" Expansive CERCLA Liability for Pesticide Manufactur-
ers After U.S. v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp., 35 S.D. L. REV. 251 (1990). 
59 United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384, 1389-90 (S.D. Iowa 
1988)(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427A (1965», afi'd, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 
1989). 
60 ld. 
61 United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1382 (8th. Cir. 1989). 
62 ld. at 1382. 
63 ld. 
64 See Jones-Hamilton v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 695 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 781 F. Supp. 1448, 1452, order clarified, 781 
F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
65 See id. 
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private party relief for personal injuries.66 Although CERCLA does 
provide for private party response cost actions,67 a plaintiff who pro-
ceeds along this avenue must negotiate several procedural barriers 
outlined in the statute.68 
Section 9607(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA provides for recovery of "any 
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person con-
sistent with the national contingency plan."69 Courts interpret this 
section as a requirement that a private party must clean up the 
contaminated site using their own resources prior to seeking recovery 
from the responsible parties.70 Additionally, the response costs for 
which recovery is sought must be both "consistent with the national 
contingency plan" and "necessary."71 This vague language has led to 
some uncertainty as to what costs are recoverable in a private party 
suit.72 The ambiguity of these terms combined with the substantial 
private investment required prior to litigation illustrate why private 
parties may find it preferable to bring a suit under the common law 
when they have suffered harm from the actions of toll manufactur-
ers.73 
Pursuing an action under the common law has many other advan-
tages. For example, the common law offers private litigants greater 
control over the course oflitigation as well as the opportunity to more 
effectively tailor the remedy to the harm that has been suffered.74 
Thus, while CERCLA is an effective tool for federal and state gov-
66 Dan A. Tanenbaum, Note, When Does Going to the Doctar Serve the Public Health? Medical 
Monitoring Response Costs Under CERCLA, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 925, 926 (1992). 
67 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). 
68 See generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. et al., Cost Recovery By Private Parties Under CER-
CLk Planning a Response Actiou For Maximum Recovery, 27 TuLSA L.J. 365 (1992) (discuss-
ing the requirements for bringing a private party response cost action). 
69 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). See also 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of 
Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1357--59 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2014 (1991) (citing additional 
steps that plaintiff must establish to prevail in a private cost recovery action). 
70 See Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3rd Cir. 
1988); Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985). See also Reitze et al., 
supra note 68, at 382-84. 
7142 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). 
72 See Reitze et al., supra note 68, at 399-401. For example see Sidney M. Wolf, Up in the Air: 
Recovery of Attarney Fees in a CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) Suit, 69 N.D. L. REV. 275 (1993), 
discussing whether attorney's fees are recoverable. 
73 See also Jim C. Chen & Kyle E. McSlarrow, Application of the Abnarmally Dangerous 
Activities Doctrine to Enviroumental Cleanups, 47 Bus. LAW. 1031, 1045 (1992). 
74 PLATER ET AL., supra note 13, at 257 (noting for example that in the case of the Exxon-
Valdez oil spill, "although more than a dozen state and federal statutes apply to oil production 
and transport ... the State of Alaska's litigation against the oil companies was non-statutory, 
based upon common law theories"). 
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ernments to address the environmental contamination caused by toll-
ing arrangements, private parties may find their needs better met 
under the common law. 
III. VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR ABNORMALLY 
DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES 
Recent developments in the common law suggest that principals 
who hire toll manufacturers to work with hazardous materials may 
be strictly liable under the common law based on the abnormally 
dangerous activity exception to the independent contractor rule.75 To 
understand the recent case law developments, it is first necessary to 
examine the historical and policy foundations of vicarious liability and 
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. The scope and 
application of both of these doctrines has changed over time reflecting 
policy choices that reflect social and economic concerns.76 In recent 
years, some environmental case law has expanded the doctrine of 
vicarious liability for abnormally dangerous activities to include work 
that involves the handling of hazardous materials.77 
A. Vicarious Liability 
Vicarious liability is the "imposition of liability on one person for 
the actionable conduct of another."78 Liability is based on some rela-
tionship between the two parties.79 One common form of vicarious 
liability is the imposition of liability on an employer for the wrong 
committed by an employee.8o This type of liability is called respondeat 
superior.81 In the late 19th century the courts created an exception to 
the doctrine of respondeat superior, where the wrong was committed 
by an independent contractor rather than an employee.82 The inde-
pendent contractor rule, in turn, has also been subject to numerous 
exceptions throughout the 20th century.83 One such exception is when 
the independent contractor's work is abnormally dangerous.84 
75 See discussion infra part III.D and supra part II.B. 
76 See discussion infra parts liLA, IILC. 
77 See discussion infra parts IILC, IILD. 
78 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1566 (6th ed. 1990) 
79 [d. 
80 See id. 
81 KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 69, at 499-500. 
82 [d. § 71, at 509. 
83 See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text. 
84 See discussion infra part IILB. 
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1. The Historical and Policy Foundations of Respondeat Superior 
In order for employers to be vicariously liable, courts require that 
they retain control or the right of control over their agents.85 Histori-
cally, the right of control was used not only as a test for the imposition 
of vicarious liability but also as a justification for holding employers 
liable for the torts of their employees.86 In practice, however, the 
control test does not adequately explain the application of vicarious 
liability in the business context.87 Critics argue that the right of con-
trol is a legal fiction created by the courts to justify vicarious liability.88 
In actuality, it is argued, courts hold employers vicariously liable to 
address certain policy concerns.89 These policy concerns include a 
growing concern for the "plight of uncompensated accident victims."9o 
Additionally, the doctrine was justified by the superior ability of 
employers to pay and distribute losses.91 
Regardless of the historical debate, it is widely recognized today 
that application of vicarious liability is justified primarily because 
of "its effectiveness in achieving contemporary social objectives."92 
These objectives include: 1) accident prevention; 2) compensation for 
accident victims; and 3) equitable distribution of accident costS.93 The 
development of vicarious liability has also given rise to numerous 
exceptions to the rule. 
2. The Independent Contractor Rule 
One situation in which an employer is not held liable for the acts of 
an agent is when the agent operates as an independent contractor.94 
Historically, the independent contractor rule did not appear in the 
courts until the turn of the 19th century.95 Industrial expansion in the 
19th century led to an increase in the number and variety of inde-
pendent contractors.96 Independent contractors often offered the best 
85 See 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.3, at 10 (1986). 
86Id. § 26.3, at 11-12. 
87Id. 
88Id. 
89 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 69, at 500. 
90 5 HARPER ET AL., supra note 85, § 26.5, at 18. 
91Id. 
92Id. § 26.2, at 10. 
93Id. § 26.5, at 21. 
94 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 71, at 509. 
95 Roscoe T. Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 511 
(1935). 
96Id. 
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means for a business enterprise to complete work and avoid liability.97 
During this period, corporate charters with limited liability were 
difficult to obtain and the independent contractor rule created by the 
courts allowed business to achieve the same result.98 
Although these 19th century policy considerations were the implicit 
justification for the independent contractor rule, courts continued to 
frame the issue in terms of the control test.99 Under the control test, 
a business is not liable for the acts of an independent contractor 
because it exercises no control over the independent contractorYlO 
Courts look at a variety of factors to define the class of actors that 
are independent contractors.IOI But just as the control test has proved 
inadequate to explain the imposition of vicarious liability in cases that 
involve an employer/employee relationship,102 critics charge that those 
same doctrinal reasons also fail to justify the independent contractor 
ruleY13 The critics reason that if the fictitious control of an employer 
over an employee is an inadequate basis for holding the employer 
liable, then the transfer of fictitious control to an independent contrac-
tor is equally fictitious. I04 
One policy rationale, not rooted in the needs of industrial expansion, 
is that an independent contractor stands in a better position than the 
employer to prevent accidents.105 A second justification for the rule is 
that an independent contractor is itself an enterprise and should be 
held liable for its own actsyl6 Thus, the work contracted for is to be 
"regarded as the [independent] contractor's own enterprise," and the 
contractor "rather than the employer is the proper party to charge 
with the responsibility of ... preventing [the accident]."107 
The independent contractor rule, however, has been subject to 
numerous exceptions during the last century.108 The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts devotes at least twenty sections to exceptions to the 
97 Id. at 512. 
9B Id. 
99 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 71, at 509. 
100Id. 
101 See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
102 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
103 See Fowler V. Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer of an Independent 
Contractor, 10 IND. L.J. 494, 497-98 (1935). 
104Id. 
105 See William O. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk I, 38 YALE L.J. 
584, 602 (1929). 
106 Harper, supra note 103, at 498. 
107 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 409 cmt. b (1965). 
108 See James B. McHugh, Comment, Risk Administration in the Market Place: A Reap-
praisal of the Independent Contractor Rule, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 662 (1973). 
598 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 21:587 
independent contractor rule.109 Commentators have complained that, 
because of these exceptions, the law is "unpredictable and inconsis-
tent."110 Indeed, some courts have suggested that the exceptions have 
swallowed the rule.11l 
a. Is a Toll Manufacturer a Servant or an Independent 
Contractor ? 
Before the exceptions to the independent contractor rule are dis-
cussed, it is necessary to assess whether an independent contractor 
relationship exists between principal and toll manufacturer. If a toll 
manufacturer is an employee or servant of the principal, rather than 
an independent contractor, then there is no need to rely on the excep-
tions to the independent contractor rule. If a toll manufacturer is the 
servant of the principal, under the common law the principal will be 
vicariously liable for the acts of the toll manufacturer.l12 
Court decisions rarely discuss the nature of the legal relationship 
that arises between principal and toll manufacturer. Although the 
case law reveals the variety of contexts in which tolling contracts are 
used,113 the issues decided by courts rarely address the legal obliga-
tions created by tolling contracts. Although a few cases have sug-
gested that a toll manufacturer is an independent contractor,114 the 
question has not been the subject of extended consideration or defini-
tively answered by the courts. 
An independent contractor is generally defined as one who "con-
tracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and is 
subject to his employer's control only as to [the] end product ... of 
his work."115 The primary factor looked to by the courts in determining 
whether an independent contractor relationship exists is the hiring 
109 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §§ 410--29 (1965). 
110 See McHugh, supra note 108, at 662. 
111 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 409 cmt. b (1965) ("rule is now primarily impor-
tant as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions" quoting Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler 
& Mfg. Co., 277 N.W. 226, 228 (Minn. 1937)). 
112 See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text. 
113 See, e.g., Baltimore Bank for Coops. v. Farmers Cheese Coop., 612 F.2d 151, 153 (3d. Cir. 
1979) (milk processed under tolling arrangement); Wieland Werke, AG v. United States, 718 F. 
Supp. 50, 56 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989) (brass produced through tolling arrangements); Genex Corp. 
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 666 F. Supp. 755, 757 (D. Md. 1987) (NutraSweet processed under tolling 
arrangements). 
114 See Pampanga Sugar Mills v. Trinidad, 279 U.S. 211, 216 (1929); United States v. Mirabile, 
No. CIV.A.84-2280, 1985 WL 97, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 6,1985). 
116 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 770 (6th ed. 1990); See also Casement v. Brown, 148 U.S. 615, 
622 (1893). 
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party's right to control the manner and means by which the end 
product is to be produced.us In conducting an inquiry into the degree 
of control, the following factors were cited by the United States 
Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid: 
[T]he skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; 
the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between 
the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign 
additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired 
party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method 
of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; 
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring 
party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of 
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired parties.ll7 
Although the precise details of tolling relationships may vary, one 
feature common to most tolling contracts is that the principal nor-
mally supplies and retains ownership to the materials being processed 
by the toll manufacturer. us Although this feature of a tolling contract 
is relevant to determining whether an independent contractor rela-
tionship exists,119 without more it is probably not a sufficient basis for 
a court to find that a toll manufacturer is a servant of the principaUal 
The primary focus of a court's inquiry is who exercises control over 
the manner and means of the work, while the issue of who supplies 
the materials is of secondary concern.121 For example in Wimpey v. 
Otts,122 the defendant contracted with a builder to install siding and 
paint the trim of his house and supplied that builder with some ma-
terials.123 The court held that the home owner was not liable for 
injuries suffered by the builder's employee during the course of the 
116 See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989). 
117 Id. at 751-52 (footnotes omitted). 
118 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
119 See, e.g., Wright v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 773 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989); Ross v. 
Texas One Partnership, 796 S.w'2d 206, 210 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), error denied, 806 S.W.2d 222 
(Tex. 1991). 
120 See, e.g., Wimpey v. Otts, 427 S.E.2d 34, 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (holding party was an 
independent contractor despite the fact that hiring party supplied some of the materials); Peck 
v. Woomack, 192 P.2d 874, 880-81 (Nev. 1948) (holding that fact that hiring party also supplied 
tools and material is not conclusive in determining whether independent contractor relationship 
exists). 
121 See Annotation, Elements Bearing Directly Upon the Quality of a Contract as Affecting 
the Character of One as Independent Contractor, 20 A.L.R. 684, 780 (1922) ("[evidence that 
hiring party supplied the materials] is manifestly overcome, whenever the rest of the evidence 
points to the conclusion that the employer was not to exercise any control over the details of 
the work"). 
122427 S.E.2d at 34. 
123Id. at 35. 
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work because the owner did not have "the right to, nor did they, direct 
the time, manner, methods, and means of his execution of the work, 
but rather asked him to produce a desired result."124 Thus, a toll 
manufacturer that receives raw materials from a principal but retains 
control over the details of the work will probably be found by the 
courts to be an independent contractor. 
The conclusion that a tolling arrangement creates an independent 
contractor relationship is also supported by the few cases that have 
considered the issue. In Pampanga Sugar Mills v. Trinidad,125 for 
example, the United States Supreme Court held that a toll manufac-
turer was an independent contractor.l2ii The case concerned the appli-
cation of a tax statute to a corporation that was engaged in the milling 
or tolling of sugar cane that was grown and owned by others.127 Under 
the contract, the toll manufacturer received one half of the sugar it 
produced from milling the cane as compensation for its services. The 
other half of the cane was returned to its owner.l28 The toll manufac-
turer then sold the half it retained to third parties.129 The issue before 
the Supreme Court was whether the toll manufacturer could be taxed 
upon the income generated from the sales to third parties.130 The toll 
manufacturer argued that although the sugar was "physically manu-
factured" by the toll manufacturer, the grower and owner of the cane 
was the legal manufacturer of the sugar.13l The toll manufacturer 
characterized its roll as ''being merely a servant hired by the grower 
to perform the service" and not a manufacturer "who sells articles of 
their own production."l32 Without discussion, the Supreme Court re-
jected the toll manufacturer's characterization, holding that "[t]he 
corporation is in no sense a servant. It is an independent concern-a 
contractor."133 Consequently, the toll manufacturer was required to 
pay taxes on the income generated from its sales of sugar.134 
124 Id. See also Eubanks v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 198 F. Supp. 522, 528 (W.D.S.C. 1961) 
(holding contractor to be an independent contractor despite the fact that principal furnished 
materials); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Kelly, 46 S.W.2d 656, 656 (Tex. Ct. App. 1932) (same). 
125 279 U.S. 211 (1929). 
126 Id. at 216. 




131 Id. at 216. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 218. 
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A similar conclusion was reached in the more recent case of United 
States v. MirabileY.l5 The facts of Mirabile involved a tolling agree-
ment between Impervious Paint Industries (the principal) and Turco 
Coatings (the toll manufacturer).136 Under the agreement, Impervious 
supplied raw ingredients to Turco, and Turco processed those mate-
rials into paint.137 As a result of Turco's paint processing operation the 
land around the Turco site was contaminated with toxic wastes.138 
Litigation ensued when the United States sought to recover clean-up 
costs from the current owners of the contaminated site under CER-
CLA after Turco declared bankruptcy.139 
The owners of the site attempted to join Impervious as a co-defen-
dant based on its tolling relationship with Turco.140 The defendants 
argued that the tolling contract between Impervious and Turco con-
stituted "indicia of ownership," and that by entering into the agree-
ment Impervious participated in the management of Turco.l4l The 
court rejected this assertion and noted that "[n]othing in the record 
reflects that Impervious was anything more than a customer of Turco" 
and was therefore not liable for the contamination caused by its toll 
manufacturer.142 
In sum, although a principal may supply materials to a toll manu-
facturer and retain ownership of those materials, the toll manufac-
turer is probably an independent contractor. Accordingly, a principal 
will not be liable for the acts of its toll manufacturer unless an excep-
tion to the independent contractor rule applies.143 The abnormally 
dangerous activity doctrine is one such exception.144 
B. Vicarious Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities 
One who hires an independent contractor to do work that is deemed 
by the courts to be abnormally or inherently dangerous is vicariously 
liable for the acts of the independent contractor.145 Stated another 
way, one who hires an independent contractor "[ w]ill not be permitted 





140 [d. at *12. 
141 [d. 
142 [d. 
143 See supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text. 
144 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427A (1965). 
145 See Majestic Realty Assoc., Inc. v. Toti Contracting Co., 153 A.2d 321, 326 (N.J. 1959); Saiz 
v. Belen Sch. Dist., 827 P.2d 102, 111-12 (N.M. 1992); Penes chi v. National Steel Corp., 295 S.E.2d 
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to escape the responsibility for the abnormal danger created by the 
activity which he has set in motion."146 The extension of liability in this 
context is based on considerations of equity and fairness with respect 
to innocent third parties that are injured as a result the work con-
tracted for.147 Therefore, in the case of a tolling arrangement, if the 
activity contracted for is deemed by the courts to be abnormally 
dangerous, the principal is strictly liable to third parties for the torts 
of the toll manufacturer. 
Applying this theory of common law liability to the tolling context 
was suggested by a federal district court in United States v. Aceto 
Agricultural Chemicals COrp.148 In that case, the court in dictum 
noted that a principal could be held liable for the environmental 
damage caused by a toll manufacturer on a theory that formulation of 
pesticides is an abnormally dangerous activity.149 A similar conclusion 
was reached in State v. Schenectady Chemicals, Inc. l50 In that case, 
the court held that a chemical company can be liable for costs incurred 
during the cleanup of a dump site owned by an independent contrac-
tor.15l The chemical company had hired the independent contractor 
fifteen years ago to dispose of waste material.152 Although the plain-
tiff's cause of action was based upon a theory of private nuisance, the 
nuisance arose out of abnormally dangerous conduct.l53 In sum, if work 
with hazardous materials is deemed to be an abnormally dangerous 
activity, a principal that hires a toll manufacture to do such work will 
be liable for the torts of the toll manufacturer. 
C. The Historical Development of the Abnormally Dangerous 
Activity Doctrine 
To determine whether the handling or generation of hazardous 
materials is an abnormally dangerous activity, the historical develop-
ment of the doctrine must be considered. The modern doctrine of 
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities developed from the 
1, 12 (W. Va. 1982). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 427A (1965) ("[o]ne who 
employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer knows or has reason to know 
to involve an abnormally dangerous activity, is subject to liability to the same extent as the 
contractor for physical harm to others caused by that activity"). 
146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 427A cmt. b (1965). 
147 See Majestic Realty, 153 A.2d at 324-25. 
148 699 F. Supp. 1384, 1389 (S.D. Iowa 1988). For further discussion of this case see supra notes 
52-63 and accompanying text. 
149 699 F. Supp. at 1389-90 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427A (1965». 
150 459 N.Y.S.2d 971 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983), a/i'd, 103 A.2d 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). 
151Id. at 976-77. 
152 Id. at 973. 
153 Id. at 976. 
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English case of Rylands v. Fletcher/54 decided in 1868.155 American 
courts, although initially rejecting the doctrine, ultimately accepted 
the Rylands rule in most jurisdictions.l56 In the 1930s, the Restate-
ment of Torts adopted a limited version of the Rylands rule.157 The 
Restatement definition of an abnormally dangerous activity, which 
has been widely adopted in state courts,158 involves the use of a flexible 
standard that is applied on a case-by-case basis.l59 In recent years, 
some courts have extended the doctrine to activities that involve the 
handling and processing of hazardous materials.loo These recent cases 
suggest that principals that employ toll manufacturers to work with 
hazardous material are strictly liable for the torts committed by those 
toll manufacturers under the abnormally dangerous activity excep-
tion to the independent contractor rule.161 
1. The Rylands Rule 
The modern doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities is rooted in the language used by Justice Blackburn in the 
English case of Fletcher v. Rylands,H'fl. In that case, the defendants 
had a reservoir constructed on their property.l63 Unknown to them, 
the land below the reservoir was riddled with passages and filled 
shafts of an abandoned coal mine.164 The waters of the reservoir broke 
through into the old mine shafts and surged through the passages into 
the working mine of the plaintiff.165 
The Exchequer Chamber, reversing a lower court ruling,t66 held the 
defendant strictly liable for the damage to the plaintiff's mine shaft.l67 
In reaching its decision, the court first considered what level of care 
154 3 L.R.-E. & 1. App. 330 (1868). 
155 KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 78, at 545. 
156 [d. § 78, at 548-49. 
157 See id. § 78, at 551 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1938». See also Virginia 
E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict Liamlity, 65 N.C. 
L. REV. 257, 265~6 (1987). 
158 See, e.g., Edwards v. Post Transp. Co., 279 Cal. Rptr. 231, 233 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Erbrich 
Prods. Co. v. Wills, 509 N.E.2d 850, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). 
159 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 520 cmt. I (1977). 
160 See cases discussed infra parts III.D.1, III.D.2.a. 
161 See discussion infra part IV, 
162 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), afI'd, 3 L.R.-E. & 1. App. 330 (1868). 
163 [d. at 267. 
164 [d. 
165 [d. at 268. 
166 The lower court held that the plaintiff could not recover based on the common law doctrines 
of nuisance and trespass because they were inapplicable to the facts of the case. See Nolan & 
Ursin, supra note 157, at 260. 
167 Rylands, 1 L.R.-Ex. at 279. 
604 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 21:587 
the law requires of a person in the defendant's position.168 Specifically, 
the Exchequer Chamber asked if an individual who brings something 
on to his land is under a duty to "keep it in at his peril" or merely "to 
take all reasonable and prudent precautions" to prevent its escape.169 
The Exchequer Chamber held that the duty was absolutePO Justice 
Blackburn, writing for the court, articulated the following frequently 
cited formulation of the rule: 
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his 
own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there 
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his 
peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all 
the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.l7l 
On appeal, the House of Lords affirmed the Exchequer Chamber's 
decision but limited its application to "non-natural uses" of land. 172 The 
court distinguished non-natural uses from "any purpose for which it 
might in the ordinary course of the enjoyment of land be used."173 
American courts initially rejected the Rylands rule due in part to 
economic considerations of industry in the booming post civil war 
economy.174 In New Hampshire, Chief Justice Doe rejected Rylands 
warning that it would "put a clog" on economic progress.175 Similarly, 
New York's highest court rejected the Rylands rule in Losee v. 
Buchanan.176 In that case, a boiler exploded in the defendant's factory 
causing injury to the plaintiff.177 The court refused to impose liability 
in the absence of negligence, noting "we must have factories, machin-
ery, dams, canals and rail roads."178 
In the first half of the 20th century, however, the initial rejection of 
Rylands gave way to gradual acceptance.179 The disappearance of the 
frontier and the development of the country's natural resources, it is 
argued, weakened the policy concerns expressed in cases like Losee.18o 
In the 1920s, state court decisions gradually expanded the class of 




171 [d. at 279-80. 
172 Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & 1. App. 330, 339 (1868). 
173 [d. at 338. 
174 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 78, at 549. 
175 Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 448 (1873). 
176 51 N.Y. 476, 491 (1873). 
177 [d. at 476. 
178 [d. at 484. 
179 See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 157, at 263-64. 
100 KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 78, at 549. 
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was applied to activities including transporting water through a 
water main,182 drilling oil wells/83 and storage of explosives.184 These 
decisions, combined with the promulgation of the Restatement of 
Torts by the American Law Institute in the 1930s, signaled the accep-
tance of the Rylands rule by American courts. Today, the rule is 
embraced by a large majority of the American jurisdictions that have 
considered it.l85 
2. The Restatement Definition 
The Restatement of Torts' first attempt to articulate the Rylands 
rule called for strict liability for "ultrahazardous activities."186 The 
Restatement defined ultrahazardous activities as those activities that 
involved risk of serious harm that could not be eliminated by the 
exercise of the "utmost care."187 Additionally, the Restatement ex-
cluded from the definition those activities that were found to be a 
"matter of common usage."188 
In the 1960s, the American Law Institute made significant changes 
to this definition when drafting the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
which was formally adopted in 1977.189 The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts first replaced the term ultrahazardous with "abnormally dan-
gerous."l90 The definition was also altered to include six factors de-
signed to guide a court in making a determination of what is an 
abnormally dangerous activity.191 These factors are: 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, 
land or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results 
from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the 
exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not 
a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity 
to the place where it is carried on; and (t) extent to which its value 
to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.192 
181 See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 157, at 264~5. 
182 Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth, 197 N.W. 971, 972 (Minn. 1924). 
183 Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 270 P. 952, 954-55 (Cal. 1928). 
184 Exner v. Shennan Power Const. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931). 
185 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 78, at 549. 
186 RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS §§ 519, 520 (1938). 
187 [d. § 520. 
188 [d. Common usage is defined as an activity that "is customarily carried on by the great 
mass of mankind or by many people in the community." [d. § 520 cmt. e. 
189 See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 157, at 270. 
190 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 519 (1977). 
191 See id. § 520. 
192 [d. For a critical discussion of the application of these six factors see William K. Jones, 
Strict Liability far Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1706-07, 1710--15 (1992). 
606 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 21:587 
The comments to the Restatement encourage courts to use a flex-
ible application of these six factors to any given activity.193 While one 
factor standing alone is not sufficient to create an abnormally danger-
ous activity, it is not necessary that each of the six factors be present, 
especially if others are weighed heavily.194 The test has been applied 
to a broad range of activities,t95 and has lead to inconsistent results in 
state courtsyJ6 
D. Abnormally Dangerous Activities and Hazardous Materials 
Application of the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine by state 
courts to work with hazardous material has been mixed. Some state 
courts have imposed strict liability to activities that involve the use 
of hazardous materials,t97 while others have adopted a more limited 
definition of what is an abnormally dangerous activity.1°O New Jersey, 
which has experienced a wide range of environmental problems, has 
been at the forefront in this area. 
1. The New Jersey Practice 
Like most states in the 19th century, New Jersey initially rejected 
the Rylands rule of strict liability.199 New Jersey's position began to 
100 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS, § 520 cmt. f (1977). 
194 Id. 
196 See, e.g., Correa v. Curbey, 605 P.2d 458, 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (blasting); Old Island 
Fumigation, Inc. v. Barbee, 604 So.2d 1246, 1248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (fumigation); Hutchin-
son v. Capeletti Bros., Inc., 397 So.2d 952, 953-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (pile driving); 
Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138, 140 (Md. 1969) (gasoline storage); Hughes v. Emerald Mines 
Corp., 450 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (mining); Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917, 922 
(Wash.) (public fireworks display), modified, 817 P.2d 1359 (Wash. 1991). 
196 Compare Meadors v. Zaring Co., 526 N.E.2d 107, 109 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (trenching is 
inherently dangerous activity in Ohio) with Smith v. P. & B. Corp., 386 N.E.2d 1232, 1237 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1979) (trenching is not inherently dangerous activity in Indiana). 
1111 See, e.g., Green v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 595 A.2d 1383, 1388 (Conn. App. Ct.) (experimen-
tation with highly explosive chemical is ultrallazardous activity), cert. denied, 597 A.2d 341 
(Conn. 1991); T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d. 1249, 1261 (N.J. 1991) 
(processing, handling, and disposing of radium constituted abnormally dangerous activity); 
Speer & Sons Nursery, Inc. v. Duyck, 759 P.2d 1133, 1134 (Or. Ct. App.) (spraying of chemical 
herbicide could be abnormally dangerous activity), review denied, 765 P.2d 814 (Or. 1988); see 
also cases cited infra part III.D.2.a. 
1!1S See, e.g., Edwards v. Post Transp. Co., 279 Cal. Rptr. 231, 234 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (trans-
portation of sulfuric acid was not ultrallazardous activity); Erbrich Prods. Co. v. Wills, 509 
N.E.2d 850, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (manufacture of household bleach using chlorine gas was 
not abnormally dangerous activity); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Emerson, 368 S.E.2d 268, 282 (Va. 
1988) (disposal of ultrahazardous chemical was not ultrallazardous activity); Fortier v. Flambeau 
Plastics Co., 476 N.W.2d 593, 608 (Wis. Ct. App.) (depositing volatile organic compounds at 
landfill not abnormally dangerous), review denied, 479 N.W.2d 172 (Wis. 1991). 
199 See Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J.L. 339, 341-42 (N.J. 1876). 
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shift in the early 1960s with the decision of Berg v. Reaction Motors 
Division.20o The court in that case, without reference to Rylands, held 
the defendant liable for property damage resulting from the testing 
of a rocket engine.201 The decision rested primarily on "considerations 
of reasonableness, fairness and morality."202 Although the defendant's 
activities may have been conducted with great care and were a source 
of great public utility, the court concluded that the defendant was 
engaged in an ultrahazardous activity and should "pay its own way" 
in the event damage was caused to others.203 Thus, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that the defendant must compensate the plain-
tiffs for damage to their homes caused by vibrations from the testing 
of the rocket engine.204 
New Jersey's highest court did not explicitly adopt the Rylands 
rule until 1983 in the landmark case State, Department of Environ-
mental Protection v. Ventron COrp.205 In Ventron, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether or not 
the disposal of toxic wastes was an abnormally dangerous activity 
which should lead to strict liability.206 The defendants in Ventron op-
erated a mercury processing plant on a tract of forty acres from 1929 
until 1974.207 Throughout most of these years untreated waste mate-
rial from plant operations was dumped onto the defendant's land and 
mercury-laden effluent was pumped into open drainage ditches.208 In 
1970, tests indicated that plant operations had pumped two to four 
pounds of mercury a day into a tidal estuary of the Hackensack 
River.209 Operations at the plant were suspended in 1974 when the 
land was sold to a developer who planned to build a warehouse on the 
lot.210 
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection sought 
to hold Ventron strictly liable using, among other theories, the abnor-
mally dangerous activity doctrine.211 After reviewing the Rylands 
rule and prior New Jersey case law, the court embraced the Restate-
zoo 181 A.2d 487 (N.J. 1962). 
ZOI [d. at 494. 
Z02 [d. 
Z03 [d. 
Z04 [d. at 495. 
zo5468 A.2d 150, 157 (N.J. 19&'3). 
Z06 [d. at 157-59. 
Z07 State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 440 A.2d 455, 458 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 
1981), aJJ'd, 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983). 
Z08 [d. at 458-59. 
Z09 Ventron, 468 A.2d at 154. 
210 Ventron, 440 A.2d at 458. 
211 See State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 157 (N.J. 19&'3). 
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ment (Second) of Torts' doctrine of strict liability for abnormally 
dangerous activities.212 
The court then applied the six-factor test suggested by the Restate-
ment and concluded that dumping mercury was an abnormally dan-
gerous activity.213 The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the 
activity in question created an "unavoidable risk of harm."214 The 
court also noted the variety, as well as the magnitude, of harms that 
could occur if toxic substances were introduced into the environ-
ment.215 These harms included ground and surface water contamina-
tion, and human poisoning via the food chain.216 In considering the 
appropriateness of the activity to the surrounding area, the court 
noted that the area where the mercury was dumped was an environ-
mentally sensitive because of its proximity to arterial waterways.217 
As a result the court concluded that it was an inappropriate place to 
dump hazardous materials.218 Finally, the court reasoned that the 
unavoidable risk created by the activity negated any value of the 
activity to society.219 Thus, the court concluded after considering the 
six factors suggested by the Restatement that mercury and other 
toxic wastes are abnormally dangerous and their disposal was an 
abnormally dangerous activity.2~ 
Following Ventron, lower New Jersey state courts and federal 
courts applying New Jersey law expanded the class of activities that 
were deemed abnormally dangerous.221 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court, however, was not faced with issue again until T & E Industries, 
Inc. v. Safety Light Corporation.222 In that case, the court affirmed a 
lower court decision that held that the processing, handling, and 
disposal of radium constituted an abnormally dangerous activity.223 
212 [d. at 159--60. 
213 [d. 
214 [d. at 159. 
215 [d. at 160. 
216 See id. 
217 [d. 
21B [d. 
219 See id. 
200 [d. 
221 See, e.g., Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp. 626, 633 (D.N.J. 1990) (under New Jersey law, 
oil recycling is potentially abnormally dangerous activity); State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. 
Arlington Warehouse, 495 A.2d 882, 885 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (storage of chemical 
products was abnormally dangerous activity); Prospect Indus. Corp. v. Singer Co., 569 A.2d 908, 
909, 912 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) (leakage of hydraulic fluids from machinery which 
contained PCBs was abnormally dangerous activity). 
222 587 A.2d 1249 (N.J. 1991). 
223 [d. at 1261. 
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The T & E Industries litigation arose out of the sale of a radium-con-
taminated parcel of land owned by the plaintiff.224 The land had been 
owned previously by the United States Radium Corporation, which 
used the site to extract radium from carnotite ore from 1917 to 1926.225 
The issue before the court was whether a predecessor in title of the 
site that was responsible for the contamination was strictly liable for 
the clean-up cost.226 
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a predecessor in title is 
strictly liable for clean-up costs based on the abnormally dangerous 
activity doctrine.227 In reaching its decision, the court reaffirmed its 
holding in Ventron,228 but rejected the lower court's conclusion that 
radium-processing is an abnormally dangerous activity as "a matter 
of law."229 Instead, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that 
"because of the interplay of [the] factors" used to define an abnormally 
dangerous activity, a class of activities can not as a matter of law be 
abnormally dangerous.23o The court held that such a determination 
must be made on a case-by-case basis by applying the six-factor test 
embraced in Ventron.231 Mter applying the test, the T & E Industries 
court concluded that the "processing, handling and disposal" of ra-
dium was an abnormally dangerous activity.232 
The result in T & E Industries arguably expanded the potential 
application of the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine. The court 
held that not only was the dumping of radium abnormally dangerous 
but also the processing and handling of the material was also an 
abnormally dangerous activity.233 This was a more expansive conclu-
sion than the one reached in Ventron, where the court's holding was 
limited to the disposal of mercury.234 While continuing to call for a 
case-by-case approach, T & E Industries suggests that activities in-
volving the processing of hazardous materials also may be abnormally 
dangerous.235 
224 See id. at 1251. 
225 [d. at 1252. 
226 [d. at 1251. 
227 See id. at 1263. 
228 468 A.2d 150, 160 (N.J. 1983). 
229 T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249, 1259 (N.J. 1991). 
230 [d. 
231 [d. 
232 [d. at 1260-61. 
233 [d. 
234 See State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 160 (N.J. 1983). 
235 See T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249, 1261 (N.J. 1991). 
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2. Decisions in Other Jurisdictions 
The practice in other states with respect to the application of the 
abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to work with hazardous ma-
terials has been mixed.236 While no other state has developed the law 
in this area to the same extent as New Jersey, several lower state 
courts and federal courts applying state law have had occasion to 
address the issue of whether work with hazardous materials is abnor-
mally dangerous.237 A survey of these opinions reveals that some state 
courts have moved towards adopting the position that work with 
hazardous materials is an abnormally dangerous activity238 while other 
courts have been reluctant to do SO.239 
a. Courts Holding Hazardous Materials Work is Abnormally 
Dangerous 
The courts that apply the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine 
to work with hazardous materials may be grouped in to two catego-
ries. Some courts follow the New Jersey practice and hold that work 
with hazardous material is abnormally dangerous.240 Other courts hold 
that a plaintiff's cause of action which is based on a theory of strict 
liability for abnormally dangerous activity may not be disposed of 
through summary proceedings.241 
236 Compare Erbrich Prods. Co. v. Wills, 509 N .E.2d 850, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that 
manufacturing process that involves use of chlorine gas is not an abnormally dangerous activity) 
with Green v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 595 A.2d 1383, 1385, 1388 (Conn. App. Ct.) (holding mixing 
volatile chemicals abnormally dangerous activity), eert. denied, 597 A.2d 341 (Conn. 1991). 
237 See infra notes 240, 258. 
238 See discussion infra part III.D.2.a. 
239 See discussion infra part III.D.2.b. 
240 These cases have applied the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to a variety of 
activities. See, e.g., Dickerson, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 1577, 1583 (11th Cir. 1989) (under 
Florida law, transportation and disposal of PCBs); Crawford v. Nation Lead Co., 784 F. Supp. 
439,443 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (under Ohio law processing uranium is abnormally dangerous); Sterling 
v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 306, 315 (W.D. Tenn.) (under Tennessee law, burial of 
hazardous chemicals is abnormally dangerous), a/I'd in part reversed in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th 
Cir. 1988); Green, 595 A.2d at 1388 (research involving volatile chemicals is abnormally danger-
ous); Old Island Fumigation, Inc. v. Barbee, 604 So.2d 1246, 1247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) 
(fumigation with toxic gas is abnormally dangerous); Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1187 
(Wash. 1972) (transport of gasoline on highway is abnormally dangerous), eert. denied, 411 U.S. 
983 (1973). 
241 See, e.g., Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1544-45 (10th Cir. 1992) (denying motion to 
dismiss); Hanlin Group, Inc. v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925, 934 (D. 
Me. 1990) (denying judgment on pleadings); Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413, 430 (M.D. 
Pa. 1989) (denying motion to dismiss); Piccolini v. Simon's Wrecking, 686 F. Supp. 1063, 1069-70 
(M.D. Pa. 1988) (denying motion to dismiss); Ahrens v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. Rptr. 420, 428 
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Those courts that hold that activities involving work with hazard-
ous materials does fall within the abnormally dangerous definition do 
so after applying the Restatement's six-factor test.242 Like the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, these courts conclude that a proper consid-
eration of the six factors leads to the conclusion that work with 
hazardous material is abnormally dangerous.243 In some cases, the 
courts apply the six-factor test in conclusory form with little or no 
analysis.244 In other cases the courts have not mandated the presence 
of all six factors.245 
The language of these decisions reveal that the courts are 
influenced by policy considerations when they apply the six-factor 
test.246 In Cities Service Co. v. State,247 for example, a Florida appeals 
court noted that while historically it may have been desirable in a 
frontier society to encourage industrial development by limiting liabil-
ity for accidents, in the present context of a more crowded and com-
plex society it is reasonable for those activities that are abnormally 
dangerous to pay their own way.248 Other courts have cited eviden-
tiary problems inherent in cases that involve injury caused by abnor-
mally dangerous activities as further policy support for holding those 
who engage in such activities strictly liable.249 
Other courts addressing the application of the abnormally danger-
ous activity doctrine to work with hazardous materials hold that 
summary proceedings are inappropriate for claims based upon such 
grounds.250 These courts reason that the determination of what con-
stitutes an abnormally dangerous activity involves questions of both 
law and fact.251 Because application of the doctrine to work with 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (denying motion for summary judgment); Speer & Sons Nursery, Inc. v. 
Duyck, 759 P.2d 1133, 1134 (Or. Ct. App.) (denying motion to dismiss), review denied, 765 P.2d 
814 (Or. 1988). 
242 See, e.g., Green v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 595 A.2d 1383, 1385, 1387--88 (Conn. App. Ct.), cert. 
denied, 597 A.2d 341 (Conn. 1991); Cities Servo Co. v. State, 312 So.2d 799, 802-03 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App.1975). 
243 See Crawford v. National Lead Co., 784 F. Supp. 439, 442-43 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (Ohio law). 
244 See, e.g., Sterling, 647 F. Supp. at 316. 
245 See, e.g., Green, 595 A.2d at 1388 (five out of six factors satisfied). 
246 See Cities Serv., 312 So.2d at 801; Siegler v. Kuhhnan, 502 P.2d 1181, 1185 (Wash. 1973), 
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973). 
247 312 So.2d at 799. 
248Id. at 801. 
249 See Siegler, 502 P.2d at 1185 (noting the difficulty of tracing the course followed by "gas or 
other poisons") (quoting Cornelius J. Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 
46 WASH. L. REV. 225, 240 (1971». 
250 See cases cited supra note 241. 
251 See, e.g., Speer & Sons Nursery, Inc. v. Duyck, 759 P.2d 1133, 1134 (Or. Ct. App.), review 
denied, 765 P.2d 814 (Or. 1988). 
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hazardous materials is often a case of first impression, courts are faced 
with little legal precedent to guide their decision-making process.252 
Due to the lack of legal precedent on point, courts often253 require a 
more fully developed factual record than is present in the parties' 
pleadings before allowing summary proceedings.254 In Ahrens v. Su-
perior Court,255 for example, a California appeals court held that it was 
an error to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment because 
a more fully developed factual record was required with respect to 
the issue of whether the use of underground PCB containing trans-
formers was a matter of common usage.256 The court reasoned that 
the "totality of surrounding circumstances" must be considered 
rather than "accepting bald assurances" of the defendant.257 Thus, 
while some jurisdictions have tentatively followed the New Jersey 
practice, the issue remains a question of first impression in many 
courts. 
b. Courts that Apply a Reasonable Care Test to Work with 
Hazardous Materials 
Several courts have held that work with hazardous materials is not 
an abnormally dangerous activity.258 Like the practice in New Jersey, 
252 See Hanlin Group, Inc. v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925, 934 (D. 
Me. 1990) (concluding that absence of state law precedent supported denial of defense motion 
to dismiss); Speer & Sons Nursery, 759 P.2d at 1134 ("[h]ere we have no legal sources to guide 
us"). 
253 There are, however, courts that will allow for summary proceedings on abnormally dan-
gerous activity claims. See, e.g., City of Bloomington, Ind. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 891 F.2d 
611, 617 (7th Cir. 1989) (motion to dismiss count relating to abnormally dangerous activity 
proper); Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co., 476 N.W.2d 593, 598, 608 (Wis. Ct. App.), review 
denied, 479 N. W.2d 172 (Wis. 1991) (lower court properly granted summary judgment in favor 
of defendant based on undisputed facts in parties briefs). 
254 See, e.g., Piccolini v. Simon's Wrecking, 686 F. Supp. 1063, lO69 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Ahrens v. 
Superior Court, 243 Cal. Rptr. 420, 428-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
255 243 Cal. Rptr. at 420. 
256 ld. at 428-29. 
257 I d. at 428. 
258 See, e.g., Avemco Ins. Co. v. Rooto Corp., 967 F.2d 1105, 1109 (6th Cir. 1992) (under Michigan 
law, storage of hydrochloric and sulfuric acid not ultra hazardous activity); Indiana Harbor Belt 
R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1182-83 (7th Cir. 1990) (under Illinois law, 
transportation of hazardous chemical is not abnormally dangerous); City of Bloomington, Ind. 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 1989) (under Indiana law, manufacture 
of PCBs not abnormally dangerous); Johnson & Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank in Little Rock, 594 
S.W.2d 870, 872 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (storage of explosive gas not ultrahazardous); Edwards v. 
Post Transp., Co., 279 Cal. Rptr. 231, 234-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (pumping sulfuric acid not 
ultrahazardous); Erbrich Prods. Co. v. Wills, 509 N.E.2d 850, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (manufac-
turing process that used chlorine gas not abnormally dangerous); Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics 
Co., 476 N.W.2d 593, 608 (Wis. Ct. App.) (dumping volatile organic compounds not abnormally 
dangerous), review denied, 479 N.W.2d 172 (Wis. 1991). 
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these courts also reach this conclusion after applying the Restate-
ment's six-factor test.259 An examination of the cases reveals that 
these courts generally find application of two of the six factors per-
suasive in reaching the conclusion that work with hazardous materials 
is not an abnormally dangerous activity. Specifically, the courts look 
closely to see if the risk may be eliminated through the exercise of 
reasonable care260 or if the value of the activity to the community 
outweighs its dangerous attributes.261 Like the decisions that follow 
the New Jersey practice, these cases also reach their conclusion based 
in part on policy considerations.262 
One common approach that courts use in these cases is to examine 
whether the risk created by the activity in question can be eliminated 
through the exercise of due care.263 These courts treat this question 
as being dispositive of the abnormally dangerous question.264 The 
court's reasoning in Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American 
Cyanamid CO.265 is representative of this approach. In that case, the 
Seventh Circuit considered whether or not the transportation of a 
toxic chemical by rail was an abnormally dangerous activity.266 The 
court concluded that the activity was not abnormally dangerous be-
cause the risk of accident during the transport of the chemical could 
be eliminated through the exercise of due care.267 Thus, the court 
reasoned that because due care could have prevented the accident, 
negligence, and not strict liability, was the proper tort regime to 
determine liability.268 In other words, strict liability is only appropri-
ate when negligence liability can not effectively govern the accident.269 
These decisions also express the concern that by extending the 
doctrine, the law would place an undue burden on industry and com-
merce.270 Policy considerations are explicitly provided for under the 
259 See, e.g., Fortier, 476 N.W.2d at 604-08; Edwards, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 233-35. For a discussion 
of the Restatement's six factor test see supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text. 
260 See, e.g., Avemco, 976 F.2d at 1109. 
261 See Fortier, 476 N.W.2d at 608. 
262 See Edwards, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (noting that factors are "closely related to questions of 
public policy"). 
263 See, e.g., Avemco Ins. Co. v. Rooto Corp., 967 F.2d 1105, 1109 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying 
Michigan law). 
264 See Avemco, 967 F.2d at 1109 (whether risk may be eliminated with due care is "central 
concept" of abnormally dangerous analysis); Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid 
Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990). 
265 916 F.2d at 1174. 
266Id. at 1176. 
267Id. at 1180-81. 
268Id. 
269Id. at 1177. 
270 See Erbrich Prods. Co. v. Wills, 509 N.E.2d 850, 856 (Ind. Ct. App.1987) (noting the adverse 
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sixth factor of the Restatement test that directs courts to weigh the 
benefits of the activity against the risks.271 A few cases have relied on 
this factor to hold that an activity's utility removes it from the class 
of activities that are abnormally dangerous.272 In Fortier v. Flambeau 
Plastics CO.,273 for example, a Wisconsin appeals court held that the 
value to households, business, and industry of dumping volatile or-
ganic compounds in a landfill outweighed the dangerous attributes of 
the activity.274 Thus, while policy supports the extension of the doc-
trine to work with hazardous materials, it has also been used as an 
argument against applying the doctrine to work with hazardous ma-
terials. 
IV. HOLDING PRINCIPALS LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF TOLL 
MANUFACTURERS 
Tolling arrangements provide the chemical industry with the 
flexibility needed to manufacture products.275 To measure the true 
utility of these arrangements, however, it is necessary to consider the 
harmful consequences to the environment that often flow from tolling 
contracts that involve work with hazardous materials.276 In situations 
where the toll manufacturer lacks the financial resources to remedy 
environmental damage, a legal framework is needed that can both 
assign responsibility to the principal that hired the toll manufacturer 
and provide an economic incentive to encourage the safe handling of 
hazardous materials. 
The cases that have applied CERCLA to the tolling context are a 
first step towards establishing this legal framework.277 By successfully 
utilizing CERCLA to hold principals liable for the acts of toll manu-
facturers, state and federal authorities have addressed a substantial 
portion of the tolling problem.278 Because of the procedural hurdles 
that CERCLA imposes, however, it is not a suitable remedy for 
impact on commercial and industrial activity that would result if activities involving hazardous 
materials were deemed abnormally dangerous). 
271 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 520 cmt. k (1977). 
272 See, e.g., Bennett v. Larsen Co., 348 N.W.2d 540, 553 (Wis. 1984); Fortier v. Flambeau 
Plastics Co., 476 N.W.2d 593, 607-08 (Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 479 N.W.2d 172 (Wis. 1991). 
273 476 N.W.2d at 593. 
274Id. at 607-08. 
275 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
276 See supra notes 5, 27-48 and accompanying text. 
277 See supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text. 
278Id. 
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private parties that have suffered harm from toll manufacturers.279 It 
is in these situations that an additional theory of recovery is needed. 
The common law can provide this additional theory of recovery. 
Applying common law remedies to the tolling context, however, also 
presents its own set of challenges. Because a toll manufacturer is 
probably an independent contractor, under ordinary circumstances a 
principal will not be liable for the acts of a toll manufacturer.280 This 
obstacle can be overcome. In most situations where environmental 
contamination has occurred, toll manufacturers have been hired to 
work with hazardous materials.281 A solid foundation of legal prece-
dent exists to support the proposition that work with hazardous ma-
terials is an abnormally dangerous activity.282 Thus, if a principal hires 
a toll manufacturer to work with hazardous materials, under the 
doctrine of vicarious liability for abnormally dangerous activities the 
principal will remain liable for the acts of the toll manufacturer.283 
Applying the doctrine of vicarious liability for abnormally danger-
ous activities to the tolling context will complete the legal framework 
that is needed to address the environmental harm that can be caused 
by toll manufacturers. Although some states have reached a contrary 
conclusion,284 defining work with hazardous materials as an abnor-
mally dangerous activity is warranted. 
Application of the doctrine in this manner is consistent with the 
definition of abnormally dangerous activities that courts have adopted 
and applied.285 The cases that have declined to apply the doctrine to 
work with hazardous materials have not engaged in an honest or 
logical application of the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine. 
These cases reach their decision by primarily looking to the ability to 
eliminate the risk through reasonable care as the touchstone of their 
analysis.286 These cases reason that if the risk posed by the activity 
may be eliminated through the exercise of due care negligence and 
not the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine is the correct common 
law regime to proceed under.287 
279 See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text. 
280 See supra notes 112-44 and accompanying text. 
281 See supra notes 5, 27-48 and accompanying text. 
282 See supra notes 205--35, 240-57 and accompanying text. 
283 See supra notes 145--53 and accompanying text. 
284 See supra notes 258--74 and accompanying text. 
285 See supra notes 191-96,213-20 and accompanying text. 
286 See supra notes 263-69 and accompanying text. 
287 [d. 
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This analysis, however, is deficient in two respects. First, the ap-
proach is inconsistent with the Restatement's formulation of the ab-
normally dangerous activity doctrine that these courts purport to 
apply. Noone factor or group of factors is to be considered dispositive 
of the question of what constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity 
all six factors must be taken into account.288 The Restatement explic-
itly provides that all factors should be weighed to determine whether 
an activity is abnormally dangerous and envisions situations where 
not all of the six factors would be present.289 
Secondly, as other commentators have noted,290 if a court deter-
mines that the risk created by the activity in question is capable of 
being eliminated through the exercise of reasonable care, then the 
fact that an injury did occur is itself proof that reasonable care was 
not exercised and the plaintiff is entitled to recovery. Instead of 
a proper application of the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine, 
these cases are perhaps better understood as reflection of policy 
considerations that are rooted in a concern for the economic burden 
such doctrine would have on business enterprises.291 
If a court is concerned with the potentially harmful economic con-
sequences the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine would impose, 
a more appropriate justification for not applying the doctrine is 
through the sixth factor of the Restatement test that calls for the 
weighing of the community value created by the activity in ques-
tion.292 For example, a town whose livelihood depends on a cement 
manufacturing plant may regard that enterprise as a normal activity 
despite the emission of cement dust.293 Most courts that have consid-
ered activities involving work with hazardous materials, however, 
have found that the value to the community is not sufficiently great 
so that the principal should be insulated from paying its own way.294 
Due to the substantial and far reaching harm to the environment that 
can be caused by toll manufacturers that are hired to work with 
hazardous materials, the economic burden that may be caused by the 
imposition of strict liability for that type of work is fully justified. 
Additionally, in the tolling context, expanding principal liability in this 
288 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 520 cmt. f (1977). 
289 [d. 
200 See Jones, supra note 192, at 170&-07. 
291 See supra notes 270--74 and accompanying text. 
2!1.! RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 520 cmt. k (1977). 
200 [d. 
2M See, e.g., State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 160 (N .J. 1983); 
Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138, 140 (Md. 1969). 
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manner would not lead to a substantial increase in the scope of pot en-
tial liability for a principal that hires a toll manufacturer. Because 
a principal is currently liable for clean-up costs under CERCLA,295 
holding a principal liable for damages to private parties would be a 
modest but logical step. 
Holding a principal strictly liable for the acts of its toll manufac-
turer would also advance the policy objectives that justify the impo-
sition of vicarious liability.296 In addition to providing compensation to 
private parties, imposition of vicarious liability would also create an 
economic incentive to encourage safer environmental practices on the 
part of toll manufacturers. One of the principal policy arguments 
advanced by the courts against the extension of strict liability is that 
it would place an undue economic burden on commerce and industry.2!17 
This position, however, ignores the strong economic arguments that 
support extending the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to the 
tolling context. 
The economic analysis of vicarious liability advanced by some com-
mentators298 offers compelling support for holding principals liable for 
the acts of toll manufacturers that work with hazardous materials. A 
common law liability regime that insulates a principal from liability 
may cause distortions in the market place, including inefficient alloca-
tion of resources, and may also create an incentive for principals to 
select toll manufacturers who engage in unsafe practices.299 As one 
commentator explains, when the risk of harm from an activity is 
great, a principal that is insulated from liability has an added incentive 
to hire an insolvent toll manufacturer.3OO This is because a toll manu-
facturer that cannot pay the full amount of a damage award has less 
incentive to invest in safety measures because the expected loss to 
the toll manufacturer is smaller than the actual damages that will be 
caused by an accident.30l Alternatively, if the toll manufacturer can 
pay full compensation for the damage caused by an accident, the 
incentive (or cost) of not engaging in safe practices is higher and 
therefore more safety will be encouraged.302 
295 See supra notes 52--Q5 and accompanying text. 
296 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
297 Erbrich Products Co. v. Wills, 509 N.E.2d 850, 856 (Ind. App. 1987). 
298 See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE 
L.J. 499 (1961); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L. J. 1231 (1984). 
299 See Sykes, supra note 298, at 1242-44, 1272-73. 
300 [d. at 1272 
301 [d. at 1244. 
302 See id. 
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In sum, while extending the doctrine of abnormally dangerous ac-
tivities to tolling arrangements does place a burden on principals, a 
rule that insulates principals from liability also has adverse economic 
consequences. When liability is placed solely on the shoulders of a toll 
manufacturer, the incentives to invest in environmentally safe prac-
tices are reduced and innocent third parties will be forced to bear the 
cost of harm caused by work with hazardous materials. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The threat to the environment posed by the unsafe practices of 
under-capitalized toll manufacturers demands a legal framework to 
encourage greater attention and investment in the safe handling of 
hazardous materials. If a principal is not held legally responsible for 
the consequences of selecting an irresponsible toll manufacturer, prin-
cipals will have a greater economic incentive to select toll manufac-
turers who have not invested in safe handling procedures for hazard-
ous materials. State and federal authorities relying on the broad 
language of CERCLA have taken the first step towards holding 
principals liable for the unsafe practices of the toll manufacturers that 
they employ. Private parties also need a means of recovery. Existing 
legal precedents and policy consideration support the use of the ab-
normally dangerous activity doctrine to hold principals vicariously 
liable to private parties when they contract out work with hazardous 
materials. Extension of this doctrine to the tolling context would be 
both a modest and equitable application of the common law and a 
solution to a serious environmental problem. 
